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1. Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) typically consists of 
dynamic battery powered cooperative nodes that perceive 
their environment in real-time and transmit the collected 
data to the nearest gateway node (GWN) through wireless 
channels [1]. As such, the sensors, remote users and GWN 
are the participants in any WSN communication process [2]. 
Since the GWN has relatively high computational power 
and energy compared with the sensor nodes (SNs), they 
can forward the received data to remote external users 
located further way. Consequently, WSN offer infrastruc-
ture-free packet exchanges devoid of centralized access 
points. These WSNs have self-configuring ability [3], and 
this has endeared them to applications such as industrial 
automation, military surveillance and process monitoring.
According to [1], the ability of sensing and comprehending 
unattended environments has led to their increased adoption 
in various domains. However, their deployments in unattend-
ed scenarios expose WSNs to numerous attacks, including 
physical capture that are then utilized as vectors to mount 
further attacks such as side-channeling [4]. As such, it is crit-
ical that these security issues be addressed prior to their 
deployments [5]. The open wireless channel that is utilized 
to relay packets from the SNs to GWNs, and also from the 
GWNs to remote users exposes the broadcasted intelli-
*Corresponding Author:
Peter Sungu Nyakomitta,




Efficient Authentication Algorithm for Secure Remote Access in 
Wireless Sensor Networks
Peter Sungu Nyakomitta1*   Vincent Omollo Nyangaresi1   Solomon Odhiambo Ogara2
1. Faculty of Biological & Physical Sciences, Tom Mboya University College, Homabay, Kenya




Received: 31 August 2021
Accepted: 11 October 2021 
Published Online: 14 October 2021 
Wireless sensor networks convey mission critical data that calls for 
adequate privacy and security protection. To accomplish this objective, 
numerous intrusion detection schemes based on machine learning 
approaches have been developed. In addition, authentication and key 
agreements techniques have been developed using techniques such as 
elliptic curve cryptography, bilinear pairing operations, biometrics, fuzzy 
verifier and Rabin cryptosystems. However, these schemes have either 
high false positive rates, high communication, computation, storage or 
energy requirements, all of which are not ideal for battery powered sensor 
nodes. Moreover, majority of these algorithms still have some security 
and privacy challenges that render them susceptible to various threats. In 
this paper, a WSN authentication algorithm is presented that is shown to 
be robust against legacy WSN privacy and security attacks such as side-
channel, traceability, offline guessing, replay and impersonations. From 
a performance perspective, the proposed algorithm requires the least 
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gence to many privacy and security risks [6]. This may in-
clude malicious packets injections, eavesdropping, packet 
re-direction, modifications among others.
As explained in [7], the heterogeneity of communication 
protocols deployed in WSN result in network clustering 
whose cooperation is limited to low caliber message ex-
changes. This renders the design and application of global 
security solutions in these deployments a bit cumbersome. 
Although 5G may facilitate WSN automation as well as pro-
grammability through the incorporation of Software-Defined 
Networks (SDN), the protection of packets exchanged over 
the control and data planes is still crucial [8].
Considering lower layer security at the link and net-
work layers, techniques such as internet protocol security 
(IPsec) and internet key exchange (IKE) are normally de-
ployed. However, the SNs have limited energy and com-
putational power to handle both IPsec and IKE [9]. There 
is therefore a need to design lightweight mutual authen-
tication algorithms for both lower layer and upper layer 
communication protection. The main contributions of this 
paper include the following:
● An algorithm that effectively authenticates a remote 
user to the sensor nodes is developed to protect 
against WSN adversarial attacks. It is only after suc-
cessful mutual authentication that remote users can 
access sensor data.
● A session key is derived for protecting exchanged 
packets over the insecure gateway node-sensor node 
and gateway node-remote user wireless channels.
● Real device and user identities are enciphered using 
secret and public keys to thwart any spoofing attacks.
● Security analysis shows that the proposed algorithm 
offers perfect forward key secrecy is robust against 
side-channel, traceability, offline guessing, replay 
and impersonation attacks. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: section 2 
presents some past research in this research domain, while 
section 3 provides an outline of the system model. On the 
other hand, section 4 presents and discusses the obtained 
results, while section 5 concludes the paper and offers 
some future work in this area. 
2. Related Work
The rich application domains for WSN have led to nu-
merous schemes aimed at the protection of the exchanged 
packets. For instance, authors in [10] have proposed an IP 
based scheme while a location based protocol has been 
presented in [11]. However, the techniques in [10] and [11] 
result in increased network latency. On the other hand, 
the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based scheme pre-
sented in [12] is vulnerable to side-channel, traceability and 
offline-guessing attacks. Similarly, an ECC based three 
factor authentication algorithm has been presented in [13], 
but fails to offer protection against privileged insider at-
tacks. A lightweight two-factor authentication scheme has 
been introduced in [14], but which is vulnerable to forgery, 
identity and password guessing attacks. Although the 
protocol in [15] offers three factor authentication and key 
agreement, it cannot provide backward key secrecy, and is 
susceptible to both known session ephemeral and offline 
password attacks. On the other hand, the algorithm in [16] 
is susceptible to side-channel and offline guessing attacks.
Fuzzy logic and biometric based protocol has been de-
veloped in [17] to offer three factor authentication in WSN. 
However, this scheme cannot offer forward key secrecy 
and is susceptible to side-channel, offline password guess-
ing, stolen smart card and stolen verifier attacks. The sym-
metric key based protocol is presented in [18] while a three 
factor authentication algorithm is introduced in [19]. How-
ever, the techniques in [18] and [19] are susceptible to offline 
password guessing and impersonation attacks, and cannot 
uphold forward key security [20]. On the other hand, the 
fuzzy verifier based technique presented in [21] is not ro-
bust against replay attacks. Authors in [22] have presented a 
two factor authentication scheme while the techniques in 
[23] and [24] both deploy user biometric for authentication. 
Although, the schemes in [22-24] have reduced authentica-
tion latencies, they have increased complexities.
Authors in [25-27] have introduced bilinear pairing based 
mutual authentication schemes, but which results in exces-
sive computational overheads [28]. On the other hand, the 
smart card based biometric authentication algorithm in [29] 
cannot provide anonymity and is vulnerable to impersona-
tion attacks [15]. An authenticated key agreement technique is 
developed in [30], but which is susceptible to known session 
ephemeral, offline password and impersonation attacks [31]. 
The WSN intrusion scheme presented in [32] has high false 
alarm rate while the protocol introduced in [31] is susceptible 
to traceability and smart card loss attacks [33].
Machine learning based techniques for intrusion detection 
in WSN have been developed in [34-37] based on neural net-
works, support vector machine, multi-layer perceptron, and 
neural networks with watermarking. While these algorithms 
improve the accuracy of network anomaly detection models, 
they also introduce high computational cost which is inade-
quate for WSNs. Although these techniques boost detection 
accuracy, they result in high computation complexities. On 
the other hand, the algorithm introduced in [33] for three factor 
authentication is vulnerable to privileged insider attacks.
3. System Model
The network architecture in the proposed algorithm 
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comprised of registration authority (RA), sensor nodes 
(SNs), gateway node (GWN) and the mobile device (MD) 
through which the remote user accesses the SN data. 
Figure 1 shows the network architecture for the proposed 
authentication algorithm.
As shown in Figure 1, the SNs can freely exchange 
packets with each other, which are then forwarded to the 
gateway node for transmission to remote users. Since the 
communication is over the public internet, the exchanged 
messages need to be sufficiently protected from any feasi-
ble security and privacy violations over these networks. At 
the onset of the proposed algorithm, registration of the us-
ers’ mobile devices through which they interact with SNs 
need registration at the RA. Similarly, the GWN is regis-
tered at the RA before being deployed to forward packets 
between remote users and SNs. Table 1 presents some of 
the symbols used in this paper and their particulars.
Table 1. Notations
Symbol Description
h(.)  Hashing operation
RA  Registration authority
RASK  RA’s secret key
MDID  Mobile device identity
ʊS, ʊP  MD’s secret and public keys  respectively
Ni  Random numbers
Ŧi  Timestamps
ω  RA and GWN shared secret key
Ċ  MD and GWN shared secret key
Ľ1… Ľ9  Message verification codes
ĀS  Session key
ƍ  User’s secret key
ESK, Eω, Eɸ, EĊ
 Encryption with keys SK, ω, ɸ & Ċ 
respectively
DSK, Dω, Dɸ, DĊ
 Decryption with keys SK, ω, ɸ & Ċ 
respectively
||  Concatenation operation
⊕  XOR operation
The proposed algorithm executes through four main 
phases which include parameter setting, registration, au-
thentication and key agreement. 
3.1 Parameter Setting and Registration
During the parameter setting phase, the registration au-
thority (RA) chooses SNID and GNID as unique sensor node 
(SN) and gateway node (GWN) identities respectively 
(step 1) before computing security parameter ɸ (step 2) as 
shown in Algorithm 1. Afterwards, RA stores parameters 
{ɸ, SNID} into SN’s memory. During user mobile device 
(MD) registration, it selects MDID as its unique identity 






Then, t accepts user’s secret key ƍ before computing parameter U(ƍ) and MD’s pseudo-identity ÿ (step 4). Next, 
some of the computed parameters {MDID, ÿ} are sent to RA. Upon receipt of these parameters, the RA computes 
intermediary security parameters p, q, r and s for later authentication (step 5). Finally, RA sends {q, r, s , h(.)} to the 
MD. 
B. Auth nti ation and key agreement   
Whenever the user seeks some sensor services or information, proper authentication is executed before this access is 
granted. After successful authentication, the sensor and user’s MD must agree on some session key to protect the 
exchanged data, as shown in Algorithm 2. The process begins by having the user set some expiration time ∆Ŧ for the 
exchanged messages. This is followed by user’s entry of secret key ƍ into the MD which then derives parameters in 
step 1 before validating parameter s in step 2. Next, random number N1 is generated followed by security values in 

















Upon receiving these values, RA re-computes MDID
*
 before calculating the security parameter in step 4. However, 
in step 5, the current timestamp Ŧ2 is determined upon which elapsed time Ŧ is computed and validated in step 6. If 




1) Choose SNID & GNID 
2) Derive ɸ=h(SNID||RASK) 
3) Select MDID & ɓ, accept ƍ 
4) Compute U(ƍ)=(ʊS, ʊP), ÿ=h(ɓ||ʊS) 
MD→ RA:{MDID, ÿ} 
5) Calculate p=h(MDID||RASK), q= p⊕h(ÿ||MDID), r= p⊕h(q||RASK), 
s=h(p||ÿ||MDID) 
RA→ MD:{q, r, s , h(.)} 
END 
Algorithm 2: Authentication and Key agreement 
 
BEGIN: 
1) Set ∆Ŧ & derive RF(ƍ, ʊP)= ʊS*, ÿ*=h(ɓ||ʊS*), p*=q⊕h(ÿ*||MDID), s*=h(p*|| ÿ*||MDID), h(q||RASK)=r⊕p* 
2) IF s*≠s THEN: abort session 
3)  ELSE: Generate N1 & derive ĝ= MDID⊕h(q||ʊS), Ľ1=ESK(N1||SNID||GNID||Ŧ1), Ľ2=h(N1||MDID||Ŧ1||h(q||RASK)) 
       MD→RA: {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2} 
4)        Derive MDID*= ĝ⊕h(q||RASK), (N1||Ŧ1||SNID||GNID)= DSK(Ľ1) 
5)        Determine Ŧ2 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ2- Ŧ1 
6)        IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ THEN: abort session 
7)        ELSE: Derive Ľ2*=h(N1||MDID||Ŧ1||h(q||RASK)) 
8)           IF Ľ2*≠ Ľ2 THEN: abort session 
9)           ELSE: trust MD 
10)               Generate N2 & derive Ľ3=Eω(MDID||ɸ||SNID||N1||N2||Ŧ3), Ľ4=h(Ľ2||MDID||Ŧ3||N2||N1) 
               RA→GWN: {Ľ2, Ľ3, Ľ4} 
11)                Compute (MDID||ɸ||SNID||N1||N2||Ŧ3)=Dω(Ľ3), Ľ4*= h(Ľ2||MDID||Ŧ3||N2||N1) 
12)               Determine Ŧ4 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ4- Ŧ3 
13)               IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ & Ľ4*≠ Ľ4 THEN: abort session 
14)               ELSE: generate N2 & calculate Ľ5=Eɸ(N2||Ŧ5||N1||N3||MDID), Ľ6=h(Ľ2||ɸ||N3||MDID||N1) 
                    GWN→SN: {Ľ2, Ľ5, Ľ6} 
15)                     Derive (N2||Ŧ5||N1||N3||MDID)= Dɸ(Ľ5), Ľ6*=h(Ľ2||ɸ||N3||MDID||N1) 
16)                    Determine Ŧ6 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ6- Ŧ5 
17)                    IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ & Ľ6*≠ Ľ6 THEN: abort session 
18)                    ELSE: generate N4 & derive Ľ7= N4⊕h(ɸ||N3), ĀS=h(N3||N1||N4||ɸ||Ľ2), Ľ8=h(ĀS||MDID) 
                          SN→ GWN: {Ľ7, Ľ8, Ŧ7} 
19)                          Determine Ŧ8 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ8- Ŧ7 
20)                          IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ THEN: abort session 
21)                          ELSE: Re-compute N4*= Ľ8⊕h(ɸ||N3), ĀS*=h(N3||N1||N4*||ɸ||Ľ2), Ľ8*=h(ĀS*||MDID) 
22)                              IF Ľ8*≠ Ľ8 THEN: abort session 
23)                              ELSE: derive Ľ9=EĊ(ɸ||Ŧ9||N3||N4||Ľ2) 
                                       GWN→ MD: {Ľ8, Ľ9} 
24)                                    Calculate (ɸ||Ŧ9||N3||N4||Ľ2)= DĊ(Ľ9) 
25)                            Determine Ŧ10 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ10- Ŧ9 
26)                   IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ THEN: abort session 
27)                ELSE: Re-compute ĀS*= h(N3||N1||N4||ɸ||Ľ2), Ľ9*=EĊ(ɸ||Ŧ9||N3||N4||Ľ2) 
28)         IF Ľ9*≠ Ľ9 THEN: abort session 
29)       ELSE: trust GWN 
30) ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF 
END 
Then, it accepts user’s secret key ƍ before computing 
parameter U(ƍ) and MD’s pseudo-identity ÿ (step 4). Next, 
some of the computed parameters {MDID, ÿ} are sent to RA. 
Upon receipt of these parameters, the RA computes interme-
diary security parameters p, q, r and s for later authentication 
(step 5). Finally, RA sends {q, r, s , h(.)} to the MD.
3.2 Authentication and Key Agreement
Whenever the user seeks some sensor services or informa-
tion, proper authentication is executed before this access is grant-
ed. After successful authentication, the sensor and user’s MD 
must agree on some session key to protect the exchanged data, 
as shown in Algorithm 2. The process begins by having the user 
set some expiration time ∆Ŧ for the exc anged messages. This is 
followed by user’s entry of secret key ƍ into the MD which then 
derives parameters in step 1 before validating parameter s in step 
2. Next, random number N1 is generated followed by security 
values in step 3. Afterwards, computed parameters {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2} 
are sent to the RA.
Figure 1. Network Architecture
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Upon receiving these values, RA re-computes MDID
* 
before calculating the security parameter in step 4. How-
ever, in step 5, the current timestamp Ŧ2 is determined 
upon which elapsed time Ŧ is computed and validated 
in step 6. If the validation is successful, RA derives and 
validates message verification code Ľ2 in step 7 and 8 
respectively. Provided this authentication is successful, 
RA and MD trust each other (step 9). 
The next step is the commencement of RA and 
GWN authentication which begins by having RA de-
rives random number N2 followed by derivation of pa-
rameters in step 10. Next, message {Ľ2, Ľ3, Ľ4} is sent to 
the GWN, upon which it calculates security parameters in 
step 11. Next, elapsed time Ŧ is computed (step 12) before 
being validated together with verification message Ľ4 in 
step 13. Afterwards, GWN generates random number 
N2 followed by computation of message verification codes 
Ľ5 and Ľ6 in step 14. Thereafter, parameters {Ľ2, Ľ5, Ľ6} 
are sent to the SN. Upon receipt of these values, the SN 
computes parameters in step 15 before computing elapsed 
time and validating the same together with Ľ6 in step 17. 
If this authentication is successful, SN generates ran-
dom number N4 before deriving parameters in step 18, a 
subset of which {Ľ7, Ľ8, Ŧ7} is sent to the GWN. Here, 
the elapsed time is calculated (step 19) before being 
validated in step 20. If the received timestamp passes 
the freshness test, GWN re-computes random number 
N4
* before computing parameters in step 21. Next, mes-
sage verification code Ľ8 is validated in step 22 such that 
if it is legitimate, GWN derives message verification 
code Ľ9 before sending {Ľ8, Ľ9} to the MD.
Upon receipt of this message, the MD derives param-
eters in step 24, before determining and validating the 
freshness of the received message in step 25 and 26 re-
spectively. Provided the message passes the freshness test, 
the MD computes session key ĀS together with message 
verification code Ľ9
*(step 27). In step 28, this verifica-
tion code is authenticated such that if it is valid, then 
the GWN and SN can trust each other.
4. Results and Discussion
This section presents security analysis of the proposed 
protocol, together with its performance evaluation.
4.1 Security Analysis
In this part, it is shown that the proposed algorithm is 
robust against legacy WSN privacy and security attack 
models. In addition, it is shown that the proposed algo-
rithm offers forward key secrecy
Forward key secrecy: in the proposed protocol, 
all the communicating entities share session key 
ĀS=h(N3||N1||N4||ɸ||Ľ2) for the protection of the ex-







Then, it accepts user’s secret key ƍ before computing parameter U(ƍ) and MD’s pseudo-identity ÿ (step 4). Next, 
some of the computed parameters {MDID, ÿ} are sent to RA. Upon receipt of these parameters, the RA computes 
intermediary security parameters p, q, r and s for later authentication (step 5). Finally, RA sends {q, r, s , h(.)} to the 
MD. 
B. Authentication and key agreement   
Whenever the user seeks some sensor services or information, proper authentication is executed before this access is 
granted. After successful authentication, the sensor and user’s MD must agree on some session key to protect the 
exchanged data, as shown in Algorithm 2. The process begins by having the user set some expiration time ∆Ŧ for the 
exchanged messages. This is followed by user’s entry of secret key ƍ into the MD which then derives parameters in 
step 1 before validating parameter s in step 2. Next, random number N1 is generated followed by security values in 

















Upon receiving these values, RA re-computes MDID
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 before calculating the security parameter in step 4. However, 
in step 5, the current timestamp Ŧ2 is determined upon which elapsed time Ŧ is omputed and validated in ste 6. If 




1) Choose SNID & GNID 
2) Derive ɸ=h(SNID||RASK) 
3) Select MDID & ɓ, accept ƍ 
4) Compute U(ƍ)=(ʊS, ʊP), ÿ=h(ɓ||ʊS) 
MD→ RA:{MDID, ÿ} 
5) Calculate p=h(MDID||RASK), q= p⊕h(ÿ||MDID), r= p⊕h(q||RASK), 
s=h(p||ÿ||MDID) 
RA→ MD:{q, r, s , h(.)} 
END 
Algorithm 2: Authentication and Key agreement 
 
BEGIN: 
1) Set ∆Ŧ & derive RF(ƍ, ʊP)= ʊS*, ÿ*=h(ɓ||ʊS*), p*=q⊕h(ÿ*||MDID), s*=h(p*|| ÿ*||MDID), h(q||RASK)=r⊕p* 
2) IF s*≠s THEN: abort session 
3)  ELSE: Generate N1 & derive ĝ= MDID⊕h(q||ʊS), Ľ1=ESK(N1||SNID||GNID||Ŧ1), Ľ2=h(N1||MDID||Ŧ1||h(q||RASK)) 
       MD→RA: {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2} 
4)        Derive MDID*= ĝ⊕h(q||RASK), (N1||Ŧ1||SNID||GNID)= DSK(Ľ1) 
5)        Determine Ŧ2 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ2- Ŧ1 
6)        IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ THEN: abort session 
7)        ELSE: Derive Ľ2*=h(N1||MDID||Ŧ1||h(q||RASK)) 
8)           IF Ľ2*≠ Ľ2 THEN: abort session 
9)           ELSE: trust MD 
10)               Generate N2 & derive Ľ3=Eω(MDID||ɸ||SNID||N1||N2||Ŧ3), Ľ4=h(Ľ2||MDID||Ŧ3||N2||N1) 
               RA→GWN: {Ľ2, Ľ3, Ľ4} 
11)                Compute (MDID||ɸ||SNID||N1||N2||Ŧ3)=Dω(Ľ3), Ľ4*= h(Ľ2||MDID||Ŧ3||N2||N1) 
12)               Determine Ŧ4 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ4- Ŧ3 
13)               IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ & Ľ4*≠ Ľ4 THEN: abort session 
14)               ELSE: generate N2 & calculate Ľ5=Eɸ(N2||Ŧ5||N1||N3||MDID), Ľ6=h(Ľ2||ɸ||N3||MDID||N1) 
                    GWN→SN: {Ľ2, Ľ5, Ľ6} 
15)                     Derive (N2||Ŧ5||N1||N3||MDID)= Dɸ(Ľ5), Ľ6*=h(Ľ2||ɸ||N3||MDID||N1) 
16)                    Determine Ŧ6 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ6- Ŧ5 
17)                    IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ & Ľ6*≠ Ľ6 THEN: abort session 
18)                    ELSE: generate N4 & derive Ľ7= N4⊕h(ɸ||N3), ĀS=h(N3||N1||N4||ɸ||Ľ2), Ľ8=h(ĀS||MDID) 
                          SN→ GWN: {Ľ7, Ľ8, Ŧ7} 
19)                          Determine Ŧ8 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ8- Ŧ7 
20)                          IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ THEN: abort session 
21)                          ELSE: Re-compute N4*= Ľ8⊕h(ɸ||N3), ĀS*=h(N3||N1||N4*||ɸ||Ľ2), Ľ8*=h(ĀS*||MDID) 
22)                              IF Ľ8*≠ Ľ8 THEN: abort session 
23)                              ELSE: derive Ľ9=EĊ(ɸ||Ŧ9||N3||N4||Ľ2) 
                                       GWN→ MD: {Ľ8, Ľ9} 
24)                                    Calculate (ɸ||Ŧ9||N3||N4||Ľ2)= DĊ(Ľ9) 
25)                            Determine Ŧ10 & compute Ŧ = Ŧ10- Ŧ9 
26)                   IF Ŧ >∆Ŧ THEN: abort session 
27)                ELSE: Re-compute ĀS*= h(N3||N1||N4||ɸ||Ľ2), Ľ9*=EĊ(ɸ||Ŧ9||N3||N4||Ľ2) 
28)         IF Ľ9*≠ Ľ9 THEN: abort session 
29)       ELSE: trust GWN 
30) ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF; ENDIF 
END 
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incorporates random numbers N1, N3 and N4, which 
makes it dynamic in nature. In addition, it requires knowl-
edge of RASK and MDID to computes its components, 
Ľ2=h(N1||MDID||Ŧ1||h(q||RASK)). Since these parameters 
are inaccessible to the adversary, this attack cannot ma-
terialize. 
Impersonation attacks: suppose that an adversary 
wants to masquerade as a legitimate MD, GWN or RA. 
For MD impersonation, message {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2} must be 
derived by an attacker. Although the attacker may derive 
fake random numbers N1
A and timestamp Ŧ1
A and attempt 
to compute Ľ1 and Ľ2, other parameters such as p, RASK, 
ÿ and MDID are unavailable to the attacker and hence this 
process fails. On the other hand, any successful GWN 
impersonation requires the computation of message {Ľ2, 
Ľ5, Ľ6} sent from the GWN towards the SN. However, 
since this requires knowledge of MDID, ɸ and RA’s secret 
key RASK all of which are unavailable to the adversary, 
this attack flops. Similarly, any impersonation of the SN 
requires proper construction of message {Ľ7, Ľ8, Ŧ7} sent 
from the SN to the GWN. However, this requires that 
attackers have an access to both MDID and RASK and as 
such, this attack will not succeed.
Side-channel attacks: the aim of this attack is to 
employ power analysis techniques to extract MD’s and 
GWN’s stored security parameters. Suppose that an at-
tacker has captured {q, r, s} belonging to a particular MD, 
where q=p⊕h(ÿ||MDID), r=p⊕h(q||RASK), s=h(p||ÿ||MDID). 
However, since an attacker has no access to p=h(M-
DID||RASK), it is cumbersome to re-compute these parame-
ters for any possible replay.
Traceability attacks: the intention of this attack is 
to eavesdrop the exchanged messages on different au-
thentication sessions, after which an attempt is made to 
associate them to a particular MD or SN. Suppose that 
an attacker has captured {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2} for more than two 
sessions. Any attempt to associate them to a particular MD 
will fail since their computation involves random num-
bers and timestamps. This essentially makes this message 
random, which is the same case for messages {Ľ2, Ľ3, Ľ4} 
and {Ľ2, Ľ5, Ľ6}.
Offline guessing attacks: the goal of this attack is to 
extract MD’s identity MDID through side-channeling or 
eavesdropping the communication channels. However, 
this identity is either hashed or masked in other parame-
ters in memory and before being passed across the com-
munication channels. Even if an adversary has an access 
to message {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2}, it is not possible to derive MDID 
from either ĝ or q without knowledge of RA’s secret key 
RASK. The masking of MDID in other parameters, followed 
by hashing operations render it computationally irreversible.
Replay attacks: to curb this attack, the proposed algo-
rithm deploys timestamps to Ŧi to check the freshness of 
all received messages. Suppose that an adversary has cap-
tured the current {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2} sent from the MD towards 
the RA. The aim will then be to resend this message dur-
ing subsequent authentication session. However, the RA 
has to decrypt Ľ1 (step 4) to obtain its timestamp that is 
then verified in step 6. As such, any replayed message 
will fail the freshness checks and the authentication 
process will be aborted. Similar freshness checks are 
executed on Ľ3 and Ľ5 and hence the proposed algo-
rithm is robust against these attacks. Table 2 gives the 
security comparisons of the proposed algorithm with its 
peers.
Table 2. Security features comparisons
Security feature [17] [12] [16] Proposed
Forward key secrecy χ √ √ √
Key agreement √ √ √ √
Impersonation √ √ √ √
Side-channel χ χ χ √
Traceability √ χ √ √
Offline guessing χ χ χ √
Mutual authentication √ √ √ √
Replay √ √ √ √
It is clear from Table 2 that the proposed algorithm of-
fers many admirable WSN security features as compared 
with other related schemes. This was followed by the 
algorithm in [16], while the schemes in [12] and [17] had the 
worst security performance because of missing three cru-
cial security features in each.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
In this sub-section, the computation and the communi-
cation overheads of the proposed algorithm are derived. 
This is then followed by the comparison of the obtained 
values with those of other related schemes. 
Computation overheads: the proposed algorithm exe-
cuted hashing Th, symmetric key encryption and symmet-
ric key decryption Tsm operations. Based on Algorithm 2, 
the MD executes 6Th and 2Tsm operations while the RA 
executes 5Th and 2Tsm operations. On the other hand, the 
GWN carries out 8Th and 3Tsm operations while the SN 
computes 5Th and Tsm operations. Consequently, the total 
computational overhead in the proposed algorithm is 24Th 
and 8Tsm operations. Using the values in 
[17], a single Th 
operation takes 0.0005 ms while a single Tsm operation 
takes 0.1303 ms. As such, the total computation overhead 
is 1.05ms as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Computation Overheads





On the other hand, the schemes in [17], [12] and [16] take 
1.28 ms, 2.57 ms and 1.28 ms respectively. Based on Fig-
ure 2, the scheme in [12] had the highest computation costs 
followed by the algorithms in both [16] and [17].
Figure 2. Computations Overheads
As such, the proposed algorithm had the lowest com-
putation overheads among its peers. This means that the 
proposed algorithm is applicable in battery powered sen-
sor nodes.
Communication overheads: for this evaluation, the 
values in [17] are used in which timestamps, one-way hash-
ing ouput, random numbers secret keys, identities and 
random numbers are all 128 bits wide. On the other hand, 
each ECC point multiplication is 160 bits wide. Based on 
Algorithm 2, messages {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2}, {Ľ2, Ľ3, Ľ4},{Ľ2, 
Ľ5, Ľ6},{Ľ7, Ľ8, Ŧ7} and {Ľ8, Ľ9} are exchanged during 
the authentication and key agreement phase. Table 4 pre-
sents the communication overheads computations in the 
proposed algorithm.
Table 4. Communication Overheads Derivation
Message size (bits)
MD→RA: {q, ĝ, Ľ1, Ľ2} 512
RA→GWN: {Ľ2, Ľ3, Ľ4} 384
GWN→SN: {Ľ2, Ľ5, Ľ6} 384
SN→ GWN: {Ľ7, Ľ8, Ŧ7} 384
GWN→ MD: {Ľ8, Ľ9} 256
Total 1920
On the other hand, Table 5 shows that the algorithms 
in [17], [12] and [16] require 1856 bits, 3072 bits and 1856 bits 
respectively.
Table 5. Communication Overheads Comparisons





As shown in Figure 3, the schemes in [17] and [16] had 
slightly lower communication overheads compared with 
the proposed algorithm.
Figure 3. Communication Overheads
Although the schemes in [17] and [16] had a better perfor-
mance in terms of communication overheads compared 
with the proposed algorithm, their designs do not consider 
forward key secrecy, offline guessing and side-channel at-
tacks. As such, in overall, the proposed algorithm offered 
strong security and relatively lower computation and com-
munication overheads.
5. Conclusions
Wireless sensor networks have been heavily deployed 
in applications such as healthcare, military surveillance 
and environmental monitoring. Clearly, the information 
exchanged in these networks is sensitive and hence should 
not be accessed by authorized entities. However, since 
the transmission of this data is over the public internet, 
numerous security and privacy violations can be launched 
against the exchanged messages. Many schemes have 
been presented in literature to curb these attacks. Howev-
er, it has been shown that these algorithms cannot offer all 
salient security features needed in this environment. To 
fill the gaps in most of these schemes, a wireless sensor 
network authentication algorithm has been developed in 
this paper. Its security evaluation has shown its superiority 
to other related algorithms in terms of resilience against 
side-channel, traceability, offline password guessing, re-
play and impersonations attacks. It also displayed average 
best performance with regard to computation overheads, 
and average performance in terms of communication 
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overheads. Future work lies in the evaluation of this algo-
rithm using security and performance metrics that were 
not within the subject scope of this work.
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